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Abstract
This paper investigates the causes of municipalities secession in Brazil. The theoretical model
proposes that the median voter is not fully informed about the eﬃciency eﬀect of secession on public
good provision and uses the break up decision undertaken by neighbor’s municipalities within the
state to account for his voting. Our empirical results conﬁrms that prediction.
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11 Introduction
This paper attempts to establish the relation between neighbor’s decision of breaking-up
on own municipality’s valuation, taking into consideration economic conditions that inﬂuence
the median voter’s decision regarding ﬁscal decentralization with homogeneous individuals. The
beneﬁts of decentralization come from the increase in the per-capita intergovernmental transfers
after the division while the cost is the scale loss of the capital in the public goods provision.
The ﬁnal eﬀect determines whether there is an eﬃciency gain or loss in the production function
of the public good. Assuming that the median voter is not fully informed about the amount
of resources received by the transfers, he uses the decision taken by his counterpart’s neighbor
municipalities to account for his voting.
That is diﬀerent from the literature (Tiebout, 1956, Oates, 1972, Alesina and Spolaore
,1997, Bolton and Roland, 1997, Person and Tabellini, 2000, Brink, 2004 and Chiekbossian,
2008) which assumes, a priori, that decentralization implies loss of eﬃciency on the provision of
the public good.1 Our model brings another characteristic into the picture, i.e., the intergov-
ernmental grants as a device to improve eﬀectiveness in the public good provision. Therefore,
we concentrate in the existent trade-oﬀ between capital’s endowment in a municipality and
expected intergovernmental transfers to the municipalities in order to evaluate its impact on
the public good production function. This way we ignore the additional trade-oﬀ between the
costs and the beneﬁts of diverse community living in the same municipality.2
2 Theoretical Motivation
Since our model focuses on the eﬀects of secessions on the provision of public good within the
municipalities, we adopt an additive utility function on private and public goods. This allows
us to focus on the median voter decision on public good consumption, ignoring the substitution
eﬀect between private and public good provision as well as the spillover and migration eﬀects.
We have for a municipality i,
U(v,Y ) = p(v) + Y (1)
where Y net income assumed equal to his private consumption; p is the individual consumption
of the public good; v is his vote on the municipality break up (yes or no). Therefore, the median
voter chooses v∗ = yes if the expected provision of the public good in the seceded municipality
is greater than otherwise. Consider the municipality’s production function of the public good
(g) is
g(v) = f(K(v),T(N(v))) (2)
where K is the ﬁxed capital endowment and encompasses physical and human capital of that
municipality, T is the amount of intergovernmental transfer, which depends on N, the total
population of the municipality. Observe that the public good is equally divided among the
population (p(v) = g(v)/N(v)).
1However, Brueckner (2004) introduces the costs raised to attend heterogeneous electors, the capital allocation distortion.
Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1982) ﬁnds evidence that individuals choose to live in communities with menu of public goods
similar to their own preferred level.
2See Brueckner (2006), Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) for diﬀerent perspectives.
2In addition, suppose the production function has increasing returns of scale on capital and
transfers. However, according to the Complementary Law of 1989, the intergovernmental trans-
fer’s function (T(N)) presents a concave format, which implies a diminishing return on N in
the production function.
Assume that g(K(v),N(v)) is homogeneous of degree γ on K and N and that γ can be
decomposed in two distinct eﬀects, γ = i+s. We deﬁne i as an idiosyncratic municipality eﬀect
and s as a state eﬀect. The break up pays oﬀ if γ < 1 or s < 1 − i.3
After the break up of the municipality, both the capital endowment and population in new
municipalities are divided. The break up pays oﬀ if the production function has decreasing
returns of scale. Our contribution here is to allow the median voter not to be fully informed
about the value of γ. He can only observe his municipalitys idiosyncratic parameter, i, but not s.
The uncertainty on s is related to the fact that he does not know the eﬀect of intergovernmental
transfer on the public good provision per capita. Despite that, the median voter knows whether
the neighbor municipalities in his state have successfully seceded. Note that this information is
valuable to him even when he does not have information about the idiosyncratic parameter of
the other municipality, since he can compute the conditional distribution of s.
Assuming that s and i are independently standard uniform distributed, the probability that
a municipality breaks up can be calculated, i.e., Prob(p(yes) > p(no)|i) = 1 − i.
Now assume that a neighbor municipality, say municipality n, within the same state has
been seceded. The median voter in the actual municipality i knows that γn = s + in < 1.4
The probability that the secession pays oﬀ can be conditioned on this information. However,
the median voter on i does not have information on in, but he can calculate the conditional
probability,5
Prob(p(yes) > p(no)|i,s < 1 − in) = (1 − i)(1 − ln(1 − i)) (3)
The information that a neighbor municipality has successfully seceded helps the median
voter in the locality i to choose v = yes, estimated in the next section,6
Prob(s < 1 − i|i,s < 1 − in) > Prob(s < 1 − i|i) (4)
or ln(1 − i) < 0
3 Empirical Discussion
Two methods are used to test our model’s prediction. First, we use the fact that emancipated
municipalities within the state aﬀects the probability (probit) of a secession in the municipality
3We assume that after the division the new municipalities maintains the original idiosyncratic eﬀect i, but no further
division is allowed to the new municipalities. The Brazilian 1996 “Emend Constitution” allows the division of municipalities
under some speciﬁc rules. For instance, these municipalities willing to break up have to prove economic viability after the
secession and they have to obtain the approval of the actual population. These can be seen as obstacles to divide. As in
our sample we do not have enough time span to observe a municipality seceded twice, this fact is as an assumption in our
theoretical model.
4Assuming that the median voter observes that the break up increased the public good consumption in municipality n.
5If i < in which implies γ < γn < 1, one has Prob(s < 1 − i|i,in,s < 1 − in2) = 1. On the other hand, for values where
in > i, the break up pays oﬀ only if s is low enough, i.e., Prob(s < 1 − i|i,i2,s < 1 − i2) = (1 − i)/(1 − in).
6Observe that the inequality holds for any i ∈ (0,1]. In the case that i = 0, it is straightforward to show that the
municipalities’ break up pays oﬀ regardless of s.
3i,
P(Bis
t ) = βBs
t−1 + γX + t (5)
where Bis
t is a binary variable indicating if the municipality i in the state s broke up in the
period t. Bs
t−1 is the number of municipalities within the state s that secessed in the period
t − 1. X is a vector of control variables and t is the error term.
Panel A brings these results, shown in two diﬀerent samples. First, all the 5363 Brazilian
municipalities observed in our dataset in 2004 are included. The municipalities not seceding
in the 1993 − 1996 period are set Bis
t = 0 (collumns 1 and 3). Second, in order to narrow
the comparison to similar municipalities, only those municipalities that broke-up after 1993 are
considered. In that case, the ones seceding in the 1997 − 2000 period are denoted Bis
t = 0
(columns 2 and 4). The estimations are not robust to the inclusion of the State controls for the
full sample. The eﬀect of the number of previous seceding municipalities within State implies a
signiﬁcant increase in the probability of division in the actual municipality of 0.006 for the full
sample.7 The increase in the secession’s probability in the model is ln(1/(1−i)). Therefore, the
average value of i in our sample is approximately 0.006.8 However, for the ﬁner sample, that
marginal eﬀect on the probability goes up to 0.01, statistically signiﬁcant no matter whether
controls are used.
Second, as a robustness check we estimate aggregated decision within States. In this case,
we estimate whether the secessions occurred during the 1993−1996 term are explained by their
counterparts occurred in the 1989 − 1992 within each state. Again, two samples are provided
and the results are robust to any controls. For the full sample (Panel B, columns 1 and 3), one
obtains, approximately, that for each two additional municipality seceding within the State s
in the previous period, another one secedes in the next term. That number increases to 1.5 if
one considers the restricted sample(Panel B, columns 2 and 4).
These results show that municipalities take into consideration their within State counter-
partss decision to break up in a previous period which reinforces our theoretical predictions.
7That is 0.0008 but not statistically signiﬁcant when State controls are incorporated.
8A possible shortcoming is that these local municipalities observe the State ﬁxed eﬀect, not through their counterparts
previous decisions to secede. In this case, a shock in that ﬁxed eﬀect would lead to a secession spur in those municipalities
within that State. However, we test that alternative explanation by running the same regressions but replacing the number
of secession in the previous period by the the ones in the current period. No eﬀects are found. This refuses the idea that
observable contemporaneous state shocks are the cause of our results.
4Table 1: Empirical Results
Panel A - Probit Estimation Dependent Variable: Seceding Municipality (Yes=1,No=0)
Independent variable Full Sample After 1993 Full Sample After 1993
Number of Seceding Municipali-
ties in State (First Term after the
Constitution) 1988-1992
0.006*** 0.012** 0.0008 0.017***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Municipalities Controls YES YES YES YES
States Controls NO NO YES YES
Observations 5.363 972 5.363 972
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.1 0.15 0.14
Panel B - OLS Estimation Dependent Variable: Number of New Municipalities within State
Independent variable Full Sample After 1993 Full Sample After 1993
Number of Seceding Municipali-
ties in State (First Term after the
Constitution) 1988-1992
0.503*** 0.739** 0.427*** 0.876***
(0.010) (0.017) (0.009) (0.025)
Municipalities Controls YES YES YES YES
States Controls NO NO YES YES
Observations 5.363 972 5.363 972
Adjusted R2 0.49 0.76 0.73 0.8
Note: * means signiﬁcant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. In parentheses we report the standard errors.
The Municipality controls are The Average Tax Revenue (1997-2000 - the ﬁrst term after the end of incentives to breaking up
municipalities), The Average Grants from States Government (1997-2000), The Average Grants from Federal Government (1997-
2000), The Average Education and Culture Expenditure (1997-2000), The Average Health and Sewer Expenditure (1997-2000),
The Average Legislative Expenditure(1997-2000), The Average Investment (1997-2000), The Municipality Population (2000), The
Percentage of houses with power energy and TV (2000). The States controls are The Average Transportation Expenditure per
capita (1989-1992), The Housing Expenditure per capita (1989-1992), The Average Health and Sewer Expenditure per capita
(1989-2002), The Average Education and Culture Expenditure per capita (1989-2002), the Average Salary Expenditure per capita
(1989-20002). Source of data: The Regional Electoral Courts (TREs) and IPEADATA (IBGE, The National Treasury).
4 Conclusion
This paper investigates the causes of municipalities secession in Brazil. The theoretical model
proposes that the median voter is not fully informed about the amount of resources received
from the intergovernmental transfers and uses the break up decision undertaken by neighbor’s
municipalities within the state to account for his voting. The inclusion of intergovernmental
transfers as a beneﬁt component after decentralization might seem to be a particular char-
acteristic of the Brazilian municipalities. After the implementation of 1989 Complementary
Law, many municipalities requested their emancipation and the ones that succeeded observed
a higher amount of intergovernmental transfers (see Bremakaer, 2001)).
Our results indicate that the break up decision undertaken by neighbor’s municipalities
within the state has a positive impact on the median voter’s decision of the municipality ana-
lyzed. This reinforces our theoretical predictions where local municipalities might not be fully
informed on the State component of the local production function of the public good and seem
to use the information on the neighbors municipalities to capture the State eﬀect.
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